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Abstract
In this article we study learnability of fully observable, universally applicable action models of dynamic epistemic logic.
We introduce a framework for actions seen as sets of transitions between propositional states and we relate them to their
dynamic epistemic logic representations as action models. We introduce and discuss a wide range of properties of actions and
action models and relate them via correspondence results. We check two basic learnability criteria for action models: finite
identifiability (conclusively inferring the appropriate action model in finite time) and identifiability in the limit (inconclusive
convergence to the right action model). We show that deterministic actions are finitely identifiable, while arbitrary (non-
deterministic) actions require more learning power—they are identifiable in the limit. We then move on to a particular
learning method, i.e. learning via update, which proceeds via restriction of a space of events within a learning-specific action
model. We show how this method can be adapted to learn conditional and unconditional deterministic action models. We
propose update learning mechanisms for the afore mentioned classes of actions and analyse their computational complexity.
Finally, we study a parametrized learning method which makes use of the upper bound on the number of propositions relevant
for a given learning scenario. We conclude with describing related work and numerous directions of further work.
Keywords: Action model learning, dynamic epistemic logic, action types, formal learning theory, computational complexity.
1 Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) allows analysing knowledge change in a systematic way. The static
component of a situation is represented by an epistemic model, while the structure of the dynamic
component is encoded in an action model. An action model can be applied to the epistemic model via
the so-called product update operation, resulting in a new up-to-date epistemic model of the situation,
after the action has been executed. This setting is particularly useful for modelling the process of
epistemic planning (see [1, 9]): one can ask which sequence of actions should be executed in order for
a given epistemic formula to hold in the resulting epistemic model. A planning agent might not know
the effects of her actions, so she will initially not be able to plan to achieve any goals. However, if she
can learn the relevant action models through observing the effect of the actions (either by executing
the actions herself, or by observing other agents), she will eventually learn how to plan. Our ultimate
goal is to integrate learning of actions into (epistemic) planning agents.
In this article, we seek to lay the foundations for this goal by studying learnability of action models
from streams of observations. We investigate possible learning mechanisms involved in discovering
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2 Learning to act
the ‘internal structure’ of actions on the basis of their executions. In other words, we are concerned
with qualitative learning of action models on the basis of observations of pairs of the form (initial
state, resulting state). We contrast the extensional view of actions (as sets of transitions observed
by the learning agent) with their more concise representations as action models (which can serve as
learner’s hypothesis language).
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we recall the standard notions of epistemic logic,
then we move to discuss actions as sets of transitions between propositional states. We relate this
general setting to that of action models in dynamic epistemic logic via correspondence theorems.
While doing that we also give ways to simplify action models without giving up their power. In
Section 2, we study general learnability properties of action models, drawing from the existing work
on the concepts of formal learning theory applied to dynamic epistemic logic (see, e.g. [15–17]). We
show that deterministic action models are conclusively learnable (finitely identifiable), while arbitrary
(including non-deterministic) actions are not. We then show that the latter class is identifiable in the
limit. In the rest of the article we study learning deterministic actions by update, i.e. by removing
components of action models which are inconsistent with the incoming information. In Section 3,
we propose an update learner which finitely identifies unconditional deterministic action models, we
analyse the learner’s complexity, and discuss possibilities for improvements. In Section 4, we do
the same for conditional deterministic action models. Finally, we introduce and study the concept of
parametrized learning, which makes use of the upper bound on the number of propositions relevant
for a given learning scenario. In the last section, we conclude and discuss directions of further work.
This article is an extension of [10]. The additions are substantial and include the conceptual
separation between actions and action models, improved definitions of a variety of properties of
actions, improved update learning methods, a new notion of effect learning, computational complexity
results, a strengthened parametrized learning result, and full proofs of all results.
1.1 Epistemic language and states
Following the conventions of automated planning, we take the set of atomic propositions and the set
of actions to be finite. In the following, P will always refer to a given finite set of atomic propositions
(atoms). To keep the exposition simple, we will generally not mention the dependency on P when
defining our languages, states and actions.
We define the epistemic language Lepis in the following way:
φ ::=⊤ | p | ¬φ | φ∧φ | Kφ,
where p∈P. The language Lprop is the propositional sublanguage without the Kφ clause. By means
of the standard abbreviations we introduce the additional symbols→,∨,↔ and⊥. A literal is either
⊤, a proposition p∈P or the negation of a proposition, ¬p.
Definition 1 (Epistemic models and states)
An epistemic model is m= (W ,R,V ), where W is a finite set of worlds, R⊆W×W is an equivalence
relation, called the indistinguishability relation, and V :P→P(W ) is a valuation function. An
epistemic state is a pointed epistemic model (m,w) consisting of an epistemic model m= (W ,R,V )
and a distinguished world w∈W , called the actual world.
Apropositional state (or simply state) s is a set of atomic propositions, s⊆P. One can just as well think
of a propositional state in terms of a propositional valuation νs :P→ {0,1}. We identify propositional
states and singleton epistemic models via the following canonical isomorphism. A propositional
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/logcom/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/logcom/exx036/4695480
by Zhejiang University user
on 12 December 2017
[10:22 28/11/2017 exx036.tex] LogCom: Journal of Logic and Computation Page: 3 1–29
Learning to act 3
state s⊆P is isomorphic to the epistemic model m= ({w},{(w,w)},V ) where V (p)={w} if p∈s and
V (p)=∅ otherwise. Truth for Lepis in epistemic states (and hence propositional states) (m,w) with
m= (W ,R,V ) is defined as follows:
(m,w) |=p iff w∈V (p)
(m,w) |=¬φ iff m,w ̸|=φ
(m,w) |=φ∧ψ iff m,w |=φ and m,w |=ψ
(m,w) |=Kφ iff for all v∈W , if wRv then m,v |=φ
We write |=φ to mean that (m,w) |=φ for all epistemic states (m,w). When φ∈Lprop, |=φ simply
means that φ is propositionally valid. We write φ |=ψ to mean that for all epistemic states (m,w), if
(m,w) |=φ then (m,w) |=ψ .
1.2 Actions
Actions can be thought of as state-transition functions, i.e. mappings that transform propositional
states. Equivalently, an action can be taken extensionally, as the set of pairs (s,s′), where s′ is a state
that can be reached by executing the action in state s. We make use of this extensional representation
below by defining the general notion of an action in terms of the possible state transitions it induces.
Definition 2
An action α is a subset of 2P×2P. The action is deterministic if for every s∈2P, there exists at most
one s′ ∈2P with (s,s′)∈α. The action is universally applicable if for every s∈2P, there is at least one
s′ ∈2P with (s,s′)∈α.
Determinism means that an action cannot yield two different effects in one propositional state.
Universal applicability means that the action always yields an outcome. In this article we will almost
exclusively be concerned with universally applicable actions. To understand the reason for this
restriction consider the example of an action open_door. One might say that the action is only
applicable if the door is currently closed and unlocked. When the door is either already open or is
locked the action will not yield the desired results. We are then faced with a modelling choice, we
can either say that the transition function is partial, i.e. sometimes undefined, or prescribe that in
such circumstances simply ‘nothing happens’, i.e. the function returns the same state. In this article
we will keep to the latter option, for two reasons. First, if an agent is learning the results of an action,
she should in any possible state be able to attempt executing the action, and hence the action should
specify an outcome of this attempt. Secondly, it will slightly simplify our later definitions and results.
Let us now turn to conditionality of actions. As an intuitive example of a conditional action we
can consider a push button that turns a lamp on if the lamp is off and vice versa. The outcome of
the action of pushing the button depends on the initial state of the lamp, i.e. it is conditional on the
precondition of the lamp being on. In order to define the notion of conditionality in full generality
we need to go through a number of relevant concepts. Let us start with defining what it mean for
an action to be uniform in a set of propositions. In the definition below, we use ⊖ to denote the
symmetric difference between two sets.
Definition 3
A deterministic, universally applicable action α is said to be uniform in a set of atomic propositions
S⊆P if the following condition holds:
• For all s∈2P there exist disjoint sets P+ and P− such that for all s′ ∈2P with s′⊖s⊆S, (s′,(s′−
P−)∪P+)∈α.
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4 Learning to act
Intuitively, an action α is uniform in the set of propositions S if the behaviour of α does not change
as long as the initial states only vary on the propositions in S.
Proposition 1
For any deterministic, universally applicable action α there is a largest set S that α is uniform in.
Proof. It suffices to prove that if α is uniform in both S0 and S1 then it is uniform in S0∪S1. Let
s∈2P be given. We need to find disjoint sets P+ and P− such that for all s′ ∈2P with s′⊖s⊆S0∪S1,
(s′,(s′−P−)∪P+)∈α. By uniformity in S0, there exists disjoint sets P+0,s and P−0,s such that for all t
with t⊖s⊆S0, (t,(t−P−0,s)∪P+0,s)∈α. By uniformity in S1, for each such t there exists disjoint sets
P+1,t and P
−
1,t such that for all s
′ with s′⊖t⊆S1, (s′,(s′−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∈α.
Claim 1. For all t with s⊖t⊆S0, we have (P+1,t⊖P+1,s)∩S1 = (P−1,t⊖P−1,s)∩S1 =∅.
Proof of claim. We only show (P+1,t⊖P+1,s)∩S1 =∅, the other case being symmetric. Let s¯=s−S1
and t¯= t−S1. Then s⊖ s¯⊆S1, t⊖ t¯⊆S1, and s¯⊖ t¯⊆s⊖t⊆S0. From s⊖ s¯⊆S1, t⊖ t¯⊆S1 and choice
of P+1,s,P
−
1,s,P
+
1,t and P
−
1,t , we get
(s¯,(s¯−P−1,s)∪P+1,s)∈α (1)
(t¯,(t¯−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∈α (2)
By uniformity in S0 there exists disjoint sets P+0,s¯ and P−0,s¯ such that for all u with u⊖ s¯⊆S0 we have
(u,(u−P−0,s¯)∪P+0,s¯)∈α. Using s¯⊖ t¯⊆S0 we then get
(s¯,(s¯−P−0,s¯)∪P+0,s¯)∈α (3)
(t¯,(t¯−P−0,s¯)∪P+0,s¯)∈α (4)
Since α is deterministic, (1)–(4) gives us
(s¯−P−1,s)∪P+1,s = (s¯−P−0,s¯)∪P+0,s¯ (5)
(t¯−P−1,t)∪P+1,t = (t¯−P−0,s¯)∪P+0,s¯ (6)
From (5)–(6) we can conclude
P+1,s⊖P+0,s¯⊆ s¯ (7)
P+1,t⊖P+0,s¯⊆ t¯ (8)
Since s¯∩S1 = t¯∩S1 =∅, we can from (7)–(8) immediately conclude
(P+1,s⊖P+0,s¯)∩S1 =∅ (9)
(P+1,t⊖P+0,s¯)∩S1 =∅ (10)
From this we get (P+1,s⊖P+1,t)∩S1 =∅ as required. This completes the proof of the claim.
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We now define P+ and P− as follows
P+= (P+0,s−S1)∪(P+1,s∩S1)
P−= (P−0,s−S1)∪(P−1,s∩S1)
Let s′⊖s⊆S0∪S1. We need to prove (s′,(s′−P−)∪P+)∈α. Since s′⊖s⊆S0∪S1, there exists t
with s⊖t⊆S0 and t⊖s′ ⊆S1. We then have (s′,(s′−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∈α. It hence suffices to show that
(s′−P−1,t)∪P+1,t = (s′−P−)∪P+. We prove this by demonstrating that ((s′−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∩S1 = ((s′−
P−)∪P+)∩S1 and ((s′−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∩(P−S1)= ((s′−P−)∪P+)∩(P−S1).
((s′−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∩S1
= ((s′−P−1,s)∪P+1,s)∩S1 using Claim 1
= ((s′−P−)∪P+)∩S1 by def. of P+,P−
Now note that since s⊖t⊆S0 we have (t,(t−P−0,s)∪P+0,s)∈α. We also have (t,(t−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∈α.
Thus, since α is deterministic, (t−P−0,s)∪P+0,s = (t−P−1,t)∪P01,t . We now get
((s′−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∩(P−S1)
= ((t−P−1,t)∪P+1,t)∩(P−S1) since s′⊖t⊆S1
= ((t−P−0,s)∪P+0,s)∩(P−S1)
= ((t−P−)∪P+)∩(P−S1) by def. of P+,P−
= ((s′−P−)∪P+)∩(P−S1) since s′⊖t⊆S1
!
The proposition above guarantees that the following notion is well-defined.
Definition 4
The set of preconditions of a deterministic, universally applicable action α is the smallest set pre(α)
such that α is uniform in P−pre(α).
An action with pre(α)=∅ is called unconditional (otherwise it is called conditional).
Intuitively, the set of preconditions is the smallest set pre(α) such that whenever α can affect a subset
of propositions in a certain way in a state s, it can affect those propositions in the exact same way
in any other state s′ that does not differ from s on any elements of pre(α). The special case of an
unconditional action α can be intuitively described as follows: whenever α can affect a subset of
propositions in a certain way in a state s, it can affect those propositions in the exact same way in
any other state s′.
Example 1
Let us get back to the simple example of the conditional action of a push button that turns a lamp
on if the lamp is off and vice versa (see also [12]). Letting P={p} where p stands for ‘the lamp
is on’, this action can be described as α={({p},∅),(∅,{p})}. This action is not uniform in {p}: if it
were, it would have to affect the proposition p in the same way in the two states ∅ and {p}. Hence,
the smallest set pre(α) for which α is uniform in P−pre(α) is pre(α)={p}. In other words, the
precondition of the lamp action is p: the outcome of the action depends on whether the lamp is currently
on or not.
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6 Learning to act
Definition 5
The set of postconditions of a deterministic, universally applicable action α is post(α)={p∈P |
for some (s,t)∈α, p∈s⊖t}.
In other words, the set of postconditions of an action α is the set of propositions whose truth value
can change as a result of the execution of α.
Instead of describing actions explicitly and extensionally by a set of possible transitions, they can
be also described implicitly, and usually more compactly, in a formal action-description language.
Examples of such languages are STRIPS and PDDL in the domain of automated planning [11], action
languages like mAL in knowledge representation and reasoning [7], and action models in dynamic
epistemic logic [6]. The latter representation is the one we will use quite extensively below.
1.3 Action models
DEL introduces the concept of an action model for representing the changes to states brought about
by the execution of an action [6]. We here use a variant that includes postconditions [24].
Definition 6 (Action model)
An action model is a= (E,Q,pre,post), where
• E is a finite set of events;
• Q⊆E×E is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation;
• pre :E→Lepis assigns to each event a precondition;
• post :E→ (P→Lepis) assigns to each event a postcondition. Postconditions are mappings from
atomic propositions to formulas of the epistemic language.
We use dom(a)=E to denote the domain of a. The set of all action models is denoted ActionModels.
In an event e, pre(e) specifies what conditions have to be satisfied for it to take effect, and post(e)
specifies its outcome. The outcome is specified in terms of which propositions become true/false after
the event has occurred. An atomic proposition p is true after e has occurred if the formula post(e)(p)
was true before e occurred. The details of how a state s is updated with the events of an action model
a are given below.
Definition 7 (Product update)
Let m= (W ,R,V ) and a= (E,Q,pre,post) be an epistemic model and action model, respectively. The
product update of m with a is the epistemic model m⊗a= (W ′,R′,V ′), where
• W ′={(w,e)∈W×E | (m,w) |=pre(e)};
• R′={((w,e),(v,f ))∈W ′×W ′ | wRv and eQf };
• V ′(p)={(w,e)∈W ′ | (m,w) |=post(e)(p)}.
The product update m⊗a represents the result of executing the action a in the state represented by m.
Example 2
Consider the action of tossing a coin. It can be represented by the following action model (h means
that the coin is facing heads up):
a =
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Learning to act 7
We label each event e by a semicolon separated pair ⟨pre(e);post(e)⟩, whose first element is the
precondition of the event, while the second is its postcondition. For representing postconditions, we
use the following convention. Assume post(e) is defined by post(e)(pi)=φi for each i∈ {1,...,n} and
post(e)(p)=p for all p /∈ {p1,...,pn}. Then we represent post(e) by the sequence p1 4→φ1,...,pn 4→φn.
Hence, formally for the action model above we have a= (E,Q,pre,post) with E={e1,e2}, Q is
the identity on E (reflexive edges are systematically omitted in this article), pre(e1)=pre(e2)=⊤,
post(e1)(h)=⊤ and post(e2)(h)=⊥. The action model encodes that tossing the coin will either make
h true (e1) or h false (e2).
Consider an agent seeing a coin lying heads up, i.e. the singleton epistemic state
m= ({w},{(w,w)},V ) with V (h)={w}. Let us now calculate the result of executing the coin toss
in this model.
m′=m⊗a=
In the figure above each world is labelled by the propositions it makes true.
1.4 Action model types
Let us now define a number of action model types whose learnability we will investigate later in this
article.
Definition 8 (Action model types)
An action model a= (E,Q,pre,post) is:
• atomic if |E|=1.
• globally deterministic if event preconditions are mutually inconsistent, that is |= (pre(e)∧
pre(f ))→⊥ for all distinct events e,f ∈E.
• fully observable if Q is the identity relation on E. Otherwise it is partially observable.
• precondition-free if pre(e)=⊤ for all e∈E.
• propositional if pre(e)∈Lprop and post(e)(p)∈Lprop for all e∈E and p∈P.
• basic if: (i) all pre(e) are conjunctions of literals; (ii) all post(e)(p) are either⊤,⊥ or p; (iii) for
all e∈E and p∈P, if pre(e) |=p then post(e)(p) ̸=⊤, and if pre(e) |=¬p then post(e)(p) ̸=⊥.
• universally applicable if |=∨e∈E pre(e).
The set of preconditions of a basic action model a is pre(a)={p∈P |p occurs in pre(e)
for some e∈E}, and its set of postconditions is post(a)={p∈P |post(e)(p)=⊥ or post(e)(p)=⊤
for some e∈E}.
Note that any basic action model is also propositional. In this article, we are only going to be concerned
with applying action models in propositional states.
Let s denote a propositional state, and let a= (E,Q,pre,post) be any action model. Using the
definition of product update and the canonical isomorphism between propositional states and
singleton epistemic states, we get that s⊗a is isomorphic to the epistemic model (W ′,R′,V ′), where:
• W ′={e∈E | s |=pre(e)},
• R′={(e,f )∈W ′×W ′ | eQf },
• V ′(p)={e∈W ′ | s |=post(e)(p)}.
In s⊗a, each world e∈W ′ should be identified with the corresponding propositional state {p∈P |
s |=post(e)(p)} (the propositional state that satisfies the same atomic propositions as the world e).
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8 Learning to act
Assume a is fully observable. Then the indistinguishability relation of s⊗a is the identity relation.
We can hence think of s⊗a as the set of propositional states of the form {p∈P |s |=post(e)(p)} for
each e∈E with s |=pre(e). More precisely, in this case we have, up to isomorphism,
s⊗a={s⊗e |e∈dom(a) and s |=pre(e)},
where
s⊗e=
{
{p∈P |s |=post(e)(p)} if s |=pre(e);
undefined otherwise.
Above, the action model a consists of events specified by precondition–postcondition pairs. For
each event e whose precondition is satisfied in s, the product update produces a new propositional state
(set of propositions) s⊗e prescribed by the postcondition of e. Note that, using the notation above,
t∈s⊗a iff t=s⊗e for some e∈dom(a) with s |=pre(e). When a is atomic we have s⊗a={t} for some
propositional state t. In this case, we will simply write s⊗a= t. When a is fully observable, we can
identify it with the set of events {⟨pre(e);post(e)⟩ |e∈dom(a)}, again since the indistinguishability
relation is the identity. We will use the above notational simplifications and conventions extensively
throughout the article.
Example 3
Consider the action model a of Example 2 (the coin toss) where P={h}. The action model has the
following properties (see Definition 8): it is fully observable, precondition-free, propositional, basic
and universally applicable (but it is neither atomic nor globally deterministic). Consider an initial
propositional state s={h}. Then s⊗a is the epistemic model m′ of Example 2. It has two worlds,
one in which h is true, and another in which h is false. Using the notational conventions introduced
above, we have
s⊗a={s⊗e1,s⊗e2}={s⊗⟨⊤;h 4→⊤⟩,s⊗⟨⊤;h 4→⊥⟩}={{h},∅}.
Hence, the outcome of tossing the coin is either the propositional state where h is true ({h}) or the
one where h is false (∅).
1.5 Relationships between actions and action models
In this section, we study some of the relationships between the actions seen as sets of transitions and
the action models. Establishing correspondences between the sets of transitions and the models is
important when studying learning of actions, because the input to the learner is a stream of observed
state transitions, whereas the output is an action model. We first define the notion of the action induced
by a fully observable action model. By doing this we indicate how an action model defines a given
set of transitions.
Definition 9
The action induced by a fully observable action model a is the action act(a) given by
act(a)={(s,t) | t∈s⊗a}.
We sometimes call act(a) the action represented by or specified by a. Two fully observable action
models a and b are called propositionally equivalent, written a≡p b, if act(a)=act(b).1
1Often equivalence between action models is defined via bisimulation. For instance, a and b can be defined as equivalent
when m⊗a↔m⊗b for all epistemic models m, where ↔ denotes standard bisimulation on epistemic models [8]. It is
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Learning to act 9
In the definition above, we have used the earlier introduced convention of taking s⊗a to be the
set {s⊗e |e∈dom(a) and s |=pre(e)}. So ‘t∈s⊗a’ in the formula above means ‘t=s⊗e for some
e∈dom(a)’.
The following result shows that, conversely, any action induces a fully observable action model.
Proposition 2
For any action α there exists a fully observable and basic action model a with act(a)=α.
Proof. Take any action α⊆2P×2P. We will now construct an action model a for α. For each pair
(s,t)∈α we define an event e(s,t), where:
(1) pre(e(s,t)) :=∧p∈sp∧∧p′∈P−s¬p′;
(2) post(e(s,t))(p) :=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
⊥ if p∈s and p /∈ t,
⊤ if p /∈s and p∈ t,
p otherwise
We define a as the action model consisting of all these events and in which the indistinguishability
relation is the identity. Then, clearly, a is fully observable and basic. It remains to argue that act(a)=α.
For act(a)⊆α. Take any (s,t)∈act(a). Then there is an e(s′,t′) in a, such that s⊗e(s′,t′) = t. By
construction of a, (s′,t′)∈α.
It hence suffices to prove (s,t)= (s′,t′). First we show that s=s′. Since s⊗e(s′,t′) = t, we have
s |=pre(e(s′,t′)). From the construction of the precondition e(s′,t′), it follows that s and s′ satisfy the
same propositions, i.e. s=s′. It remains to show that t= t′. If p∈ t, then since s⊗e(s′,t′) = t, we have
either post(e(s′,t′))(p)=⊤ or we have p∈s and post(e(s′,t′)(p)=p. In the first case, we get p∈ t′, by
definition of post(e(s′,t′))(p). In the second case we get p∈s′ from p∈s. But then also p∈ t′, since
otherwise we would have post(s′,t′)(p)=⊥, again by definition. This shows t⊆ t′. Now let p∈ t′. If
p /∈s′ then post(e(s′,t′))(p)=⊤ and hence p∈ t. If p∈s′ then post(e(s′,t′))(p)=p. In this case also p∈s,
and so p∈ t, since t=e(s′,t′)⊗s.
For α⊆act(a). Take any pair (s,t)∈α. By construction of a, there is an event e(s,t) in a. Trivially,
s |=pre(e(s,t)). From the definition of post(e(s,t)) we then immediately get s⊗e(s,t) = t, and hence
(s,t)∈act(a), as required. !
Obviously, the construction given in the proof is not efficient. It generates an action model with as
many events as there are transition pairs. It is important to realize, however, that there often exists
DELrepresentations of actions that are at least exponentially more succinct than their induced actions.
Consider, for instance, the action model a= ({e},{(e,e)},pre,post) with e= ⟨pre(e);post(e)⟩=
⟨⊤;∅⟩. Here, the postcondition ∅ of e means that post(e)(p)=p for all p∈P (cf. the notational
convention introduced in Example 2). Clearly act(a)={(s,s) |s⊆P}. Thus, the induced action act(a)
of a is of exponential size in |P|, whereas a is of constant size independent of |P|. Similarly, an
action that flips the truth values of all propositions can be represented as an action model of size |P|
(the atomic action model {⟨⊤;{p 4→¬p |p∈P}⟩}), whereas the induced action is again of exponential
size in |P|. The fact that action models can be, and usually are, at least exponentially smaller than
their induced actions, is why we seek to learn action models rather than their induced actions. We
will below even show that the action models we learn are of worst-case optimal size, i.e. no other
formalism for representing those actions is asymptotically better in the worst case.
not difficult to see that two fully observable and propositional action models a and b are equivalent in this sense iff they
are equivalent in the sense of act(a)=act(b). For non-propositional action models, however, the notion of propositional
equivalence defined here and the notion of equivalence via bisimulation are not equivalent.
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Proposition 3
Let a be a fully observable action model.
(1) act(a) is universally applicable iff a is.
(2) act(a) is deterministic iff some b≡p a is globally deterministic.
(3) act(a) is universally applicable and deterministic iff some b≡p a is basic, universally applicable,
globally deterministic and has pre(b)=pre(act(a)) and post(b)=post(act(a)).
(4) act(a) is unconditional, universally applicable and deterministic iff some b≡p a is precondition-
free, basic and atomic.
Proof. Item 1, left to right.Assume act(a) is universally applicable. We need to show |=∨e∈E pre(e),
i.e. for each propositional state s there exists at least one e such that s |=pre(e). Let s be chosen
arbitrarily. Since act(a) is universally applicable, there exists a t such that (s,t)∈act(a). By definition
of act(a), we must have t=s⊗e for some event e in a. But then s |=pre(e), as required.
Item 1, right to left. Assume a is universally applicable, and let s be a propositional state. We need
to show the existence of a t such that (s,t)∈act(a). From universal applicability of a, we get the
existence of an event e with s |=pre(e). Hence (s,s⊗e)∈act(a), showing the required.
Item 2, left to right. Assume act(a) is deterministic. Let b denote the action with act(b)=act(a)
given by the construction in Proposition 2. We now show that b is globally deterministic. Let e(s,t)
and e(s′,t′) be distinct events of b. We then need to prove that pre(e(s,t)) and pre(e(s′,t′)) are mutually
inconsistent. Since e(s,t) and e(s′,t′) are distinct events, (s,t) and (s′,t′) are distinct pairs of act(a),
i.e. either s ̸=s′ or t ̸= t′. Since act(a) is deterministic, we have that if s=s′ then t= t′. It follows that
s ̸=s′. Hence, at least one proposition p has distinct truth values in s and s′. By the definition of the
preconditions of the events of b (see item 1 in the enumerated list of the proof of Proposition 2), we
conclude that pre(e(s,t)) and pre(e(s′,t′)) are mutually inconsistent (they differ on the required truth
value of p).
Item 2, right to left. Assume b≡p a is globally deterministic, and let (s,t),(s,t′)∈act(a)=act(b). We
need to prove t= t′. From the choice of s, t and t′ we get t,t′ ∈s⊗b. There must, therefore, exist
events e and e′ in b such that s⊗e= t and s⊗e′= t′. We hence have s |=pre(e)∧pre(e′). Since b is
globally deterministic, this immediately implies e=e′ and hence t=s⊗e=s⊗e′= t′.
Item 3, left to right. Assume act(a) is universally applicable and deterministic. By Definitions 3 and 4,
for each s∈2pre(act(a)) there exists disjoint sets P+s and P−s such that for all s′ with s′ ∩pre(act(a))=
s∩pre(act(a)), (s′,(s′−P−s )∪P+s )∈act(a). Let b be the fully observable action model containing for
each s∈2pre(act(a)) an event es with pre(es)=∧p∈sp∧∧p′∈pre(act(a))−s¬p′ and
post(es)(p)=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
⊤ if p∈P+s −s;
⊥ if p∈P−s ∩s;
p otherwise.
Clearly, b is basic, universally applicable, globally deterministic and has pre(b)=pre(act(a)). We
now show post(b)=post(act(a)). We first show post(b)⊆post(act(a)). Assume p∈post(b). Then
post(es)(p)=⊤ or post(es)(p)=⊥ for some es∈dom(b). If post(es)(p)=⊤ then p∈P+s −s and
(s,(s−P−s )∪P+s )∈act(a), by definition. Letting t= (s−P−s )∪P+s we thus get (s,t)∈act(a) and
p∈ t−s. This implies p∈post(act(a)). A symmetric argument goes for the case of post(es)(p)=⊥.
We now show post(act(a))⊆post(b). Assume p∈post(act(a)). Then p∈ (t−s)∪(s−t) for some
(s,t)∈act(a). Assume p∈ t−s (the other case being symmetric). Let s′=s∩pre(act(a)). Then
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(s,(s−P−
s′ )∪P+s′ )∈act(a). Since a is deterministic, t= (s−P−s′ )∪P+s′ . Since p∈ t−s, also p∈P+s′ −s.
This implies post(es′ )(p)=⊤ and hence p∈post(b). We have now proved post(b)=post(act(a)).
It remains to be shown that b≡p a, i.e. act(b)=act(a). First we show act(a)⊆act(b). Suppose
(s,t)∈act(a). Let s¯=s∩pre(act(a)). We then have (s,(s−P−s¯ )∪P+s¯ )∈act(a), and since act(a) is
deterministic, t= (s−P−s¯ )∪P+s¯ . It follows that t=s⊗es¯ (noting that s |=pre(es¯)), and hence (s,t)∈
act(b). We now show act(b)⊆act(a). Let (s,t)∈act(b). Then t=s⊗es¯ for some s¯∈2pre(act(a)). This
implies t= (s−P−s¯ )∪P+s¯ , by definition of es¯. Since s¯∩pre(act(a))=s∩pre(act(a)), we have (s,(s−
P−s¯ )∪P+s¯ )∈act(a) and thus (s,t)∈act(a).
Item 3, right to left. Assume b≡p a is basic, universally applicable, globally deterministic and has
pre(b)=pre(act(a)) and post(b)=post(act(a)). Then it follows directly from items 1 and 2, right to
left, that act(a) is universally applicable and deterministic.
Item 4, left to right. Assume act(a) is unconditional, universally applicable and deterministic. By
definition, we then have pre(act(a))=∅. By item 3, left to right, there then exists some b≡p a which
is basic, globally deterministic and has pre(b)=∅. The action b is hence precondition-free. It must
also be atomic, since it is globally deterministic (it has a single event with precondition ⊤).
Item 4, right to left. Assume b≡p a is precondition-free, basic and atomic. Then it is also globally
deterministic. That act(a) is universally applicable and deterministic then follows directly from item
3, right to left. So we only need to prove that act(a)=act(b) is unconditional, i.e. has an empty
set of preconditions. Since b is precondition-free, basic and atomic, it must consist of a single
event e with precondition ⊤ and each post(e)(p) is either ⊤, ⊥ or p. It follows that for all states
s, (s,(s−{p |post(e)(p)=⊥})∪{p |post(e)(p)=⊤})∈act(b). This shows that act(b) is uniform in P,
and hence act(a)=act(b) must have an empty set of preconditions. !
2 Learning action models
In this section, we introduce and discuss our general learning setting. Below we define streams of
observations, learning functions and, finally, we discuss two learning conditions: finite identifiability
and identifiability in the limit. We establish that while deterministic actions allow finite identifiability,
the non-deterministic actions do not, but are identifiable in the limit. We place those results in the
context of the classical results characterizing both types of learning [2, 18, 20, 21]. This is not the
first application of learning theoretic tools to dynamic epistemic logic (see [13–16]) or to the logical
theories of belief revision (see, e.g. [4, 5, 19]). The present work is however pioneering in studying
the learning of the internal structure of actions in dynamic epistemic logic.
Definition 10
AstreamE is an infinite (unbounded) sequence of pairs (s,t) of propositional states, i.e.E ∈ (2P×2P)ω.
The elements (s,t) of E are called observations. Let n∈N and let E be a stream.
(1) En stands for the n-th observation in E .
(2) E[n] stands for the the initial segment of E of length n, i.e. E0,...,En−1.
(3) set(E) :={(s,t) | (s,t) is an element of E} stands for the set of all observations in E ; we similarly
define set(E[n]) for initial segments of streams.
Definition 11
Let E be a stream and let α be an action. The stream E is sound with respect to α if set(E)⊆α. The
stream E is complete with respect to α if α⊆set(E). In this article we always assume the streams to
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be sound and complete. For brevity, if E is sound and complete wrt α, we will write ‘E is for α’.
Similarly, an initial segment E[n] is sound for α if set(E[n])⊆α and complete for α if α⊆set(E[n]).
The notions of soundness and completeness extend naturally to action models in the following way.
A stream or initial segment of a stream is sound (resp. complete) with respect to an action model a
if it is sound (resp. complete) with respect to act(a).
Definition 12 (Learning function)
A learning function is a computable L : (2P×2P)∗→ActionModels∪{↑}.
In other words, a learning function takes a finite sequence of observations (state transitions) and
outputs an action model or a symbol corresponding to ‘undecided’ (↑).
We will study two types of learning: finite identifiability and identifiability in the limit. First, let
us focus on finite identifiability. Intuitively, finite identifiability corresponds to conclusive learning:
upon observing some finite amount of action executions the learning function outputs, with certainty,
a correct model for the action in question. This certainty can be expressed in terms of the function
being once-defined: it is allowed to output an action model only once, there is no chance of correction
later on (for a more extensive study of finite identifiability, see [17]). Formally, we say that a learning
function L is (at most) once defined if for any stream E for an action and n,k∈N such that n ̸=k, we
have that L(E[n])=↑ or L(E[k])=↑.
Definition 13
Let X be a set of actions and α∈X , L be a learning function, and E be a stream. We say that:
(1) L finitely identifies α on E if L is once-defined and there is an n∈N s.t. act(L(E[n]))=α.
(2) L finitely identifies α if L finitely identifies α on every stream for α.
(3) L finitely identifies X if L finitely identifies every α∈X .
(4) X is finitely identifiable if there is a function L which finitely identifies X .
The following definition and theorem are adapted from [17, 20, 21].
Definition 14
Let X be a set of actions. A set Dα⊆2P×2P is a definite finite tell-tale set (DFTT) for α in X if
(1) Dα⊆α,
(2) Dα is finite, and
(3) for any β∈X , if Dα⊆β, then α=β.
Lemma 1
A set of actions X is finitely identifiable iff there is an effective procedure D :X→2(2P×2P) that on
input a gives a DFTT of α.
Proof. Left to right. Assume that X is finitely identifiable. Then there is a computable function L
that finitely identifies X . We use that function to define D. Once the learning function L identifies
an action α it has to give it as a definite output, and this will happen for some E[n]. We then set
D(α) :=set(E[n]). It is easy to check that such D(α) is a DFTT set (satisfying conditions 1–3 above).
Right to left. Assume that there is an effective procedure D :X→2(2P×2P), that on input α produces
a DFTT of α. Take an enumeration α1,α2,... of X and take any α∈X and any E for α. We use D
to define the learning function. At each step n∈N, L compares E[n] with D(α1),...,D(αn). Once,
at some step ℓ∈N, it finds αk , k≤ℓ, such that D(αk)⊆set(E[ℓ]), it outputs an action model a with
act(a)=αk (using the construction in Proposition 2). It is easy to verify that then act(a)=α. !
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In other words, the finite set of observations Dα is consistent with only one action α in the class.
D is a computable function that gives a Dα for any action α.
Theorem 1
The set of deterministic and universally applicable actions is finitely identifiable.
Proof. We use Lemma 1, and hence define: D(α)=α. Let us check that indeed D(α) is a DFTT
for α (conditions 1–3 of Definition 14). 1: D(α)⊆act(α), trivially. 2: D(α) is finite, because P is
finite. 3: Let us take any deterministic and universally applicable action β such that D(α)⊆β. This
means that α⊆β. We need to show α=β, and it hence suffices to prove β⊆α. Let (s,t)∈β. We
need to prove (s,t)∈α. Since α is deterministic and universally applicable, there exists a unique t′
such that (s,t′)∈α. Since α⊆β, we then get (s,t′)∈β. We now have (s,t),(s,t′)∈β, and since β is
deterministic, we get t′= t. This proves (s,t)∈α, as required. Finally, D is computable because P is
finite. !
Example 4
Theorem 1 shows that deterministic actions are finitely identifiable. We will now demonstrate that
this does not carry over to non-deterministic actions, i.e. non-deterministic actions are in general not
finitely identifiable. Consider the action of tossing a coin, given by the action model a in Example 2.
If in fact the coin is fake and it will always land tails (so it only consists of the event e2), in no finite
amount of tosses the agent can exclude that the coin is fair, and that heads will start appearing in the
long run (that e1 will eventually occur). So the agent will never be able to say ‘stop’ and declare the
correct action model to only consist of e2. This argument can be generalized, leading to the theorem
below.
Theorem 2
The set of arbitrary (including non-deterministic) universally applicable actions is not finitely
identifiable.
Proof. Let α be a deterministic, universally applicable action. Take some (s,t) ̸∈α. Such a pair
necessarily exists, since α is deterministic. Let β=α∪{(s,t)}. Note that β is not deterministic, since
α is universally applicable, and there will hence be two distinct states t and t′ with (s,t),(s,t′)∈β.
Assume that the set of arbitrary universally applicable actions is finitely identifiable. Then there is a
learning function L that finitely identifies it. Among such actions, as we argued above, we will have
two, α and β, such that α⊂β. Let us now construct a stream E on which L fails to finitely identify one
of them. Let E start with enumerating all pairs of propositional states that are sound for the smaller
action, α, and keep repeating this pattern. Since this is a stream for α, indeed the learning function
has to at some point output an action model a with act(a)=α (otherwise it fails to finitely identify
α, which leads to contradiction). Assume that this happens at some stage n∈N. Now, observe that
E[n] is sound with respect to β too, so starting at the stage n+1 let us make E enumerate the rest
of remaining pairs of propositional states sound for β. That means that there is a stream E for β on
which L does not finitely identify β. Contradiction. !
A weaker condition of learnability, identifiability in the limit, allows widening the scope of
learnable actions, to cover also the case of non-deterministic actions. Identifiability in the limit
requires that the learning function after observing some finite amount of action executions outputs
a correct model for the action in question and then forever keeps to this answer in all the outputs to
follow. This type of learning can be called ‘inconclusive’, because certainty cannot be achieved in
finite time.
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Definition 15
Let X be a set of actions and α∈X , L be a learning function, and E be a stream. We say that:
(1) L identifies α on E in the limit if there is k∈N such that for all n≥k, L(E[k])=L(E[n]) and
act(L(E[n]))=α.
(2) L identifies α in the limit if L identifies α in the limit on every E for α.
(3) L identifies X in the limit if L identifies in the limit every α∈X .
(4) X is identifiable in the limit if there is an L which identifies X in the limit.
Theorem 3
The set of arbitrary (including non-deterministic and non-universally applicable) actions is
identifiable in the limit.
Proof. The argument is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Analogously to the concept of DFTT set,
we define a weaker notion of finite tell-tale set (FTT). Let X be a set of actions. A set Dα⊆2P×2P
is a FTT set for α in X if:
(1) Dα⊆α;
(2) Dα is finite, and
(3) for any β∈X , if Dα⊆β, then it is not the case that β⊂α.
Similarly to the argument for Lemma 1, one can show that X is identifiable in the limit iff there is an
effective procedure D :X→2(2P×2P) that on input α enumerates a FTT of α. We will omit the proof
for the sake of brevity (the original argument for the case of grammar inference can be found in [2]).
Now it is enough to show that indeed such a function D can be given for the set of arbitrary actions
over P. Define D(α)=α.
Let us check that indeed D(α) is a FTT for α (i) D(α) is sound for α, trivially (ii) D(α) is finite,
because P is finite and (iii) Let us take any action β such that D(α)⊆β, i.e. α⊆β. Then it is clearly
not the case that β⊂α. Finally, again D is computable because P is finite. !
Having established the general facts about finite identifiability and identifiability in the limit of
various types of actions, we will now turn to studying particular learning methods suited for such
learning conditions.
2.1 Learning via update
Standard DEL, and in particular public announcement logic [22], models the process of information
flow within epistemic models. If an agent is in a state described by an epistemic model m and learns
from a reliable source that φ is true, her state will be updated by eliminating all the worlds where φ is
false. That is, the model m will be restricted to the worlds where φ is true. This can also be expressed
in terms of action models, where the learning of φ corresponds to taking the product update of m
with the event model ⟨φ;∅⟩ (public announcement of φ).
Now we turn to learning actions rather than learning facts. Actions are represented by action
models, so to learn an action means to infer the action model that describes it. Consider again the
action model a of Example 2. The coin toss is non-deterministic and fully observable: either h or ¬h
will non-deterministically be made true and the agent is able to distinguish these two outcomes (there
is no edge between e1 and e2). However, we can also think of the domain of a as the hypothesis space
of a deterministic action. Given the prior knowledge that the action in question must be deterministic,
learning the action model for it could proceed in a way analogous to that of update in the usual DEL
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setting. It could, for instance, be that the agent knows that the coin is fake and always lands on the
same side, but the agent initially does not know which. After the agent has executed the action once,
she will know. She will observe either h becoming false or h becoming true, and can hence discard
either e1 or e2 from her hypothesis space. She has now learned a correct action model for the act of
tossing the fake coin.
It is a note-worthy analogy: learning of facts means eliminating worlds in epistemic models,
learning of actions means eliminating events in action models.
Learning action models via update (deleting events) has a natural interpretation of learning via
gradual increase of the ‘amount of determinism’ within the action model. Initially, the action is taken
to be able to do anything and with time the learner acquires a more and more specialized interpretation
of what it can do. Of course, the case of non-deterministic actions is more complicated. In that case,
no observed execution of an action can exclude other possibilities.
Definition 16
For any deterministic and fully observable action model a and any pair of propositional states (s,t),
the update of a with (s,t) is defined by
a | (s,t) :={e∈a | if s |=pre(e) then s⊗e= t}.
For a set S of pairs of propositional states, we define
a | S :={e∈a | for each (s,t)∈S, if s |=pre(e) then s⊗e= t}.
The update a | (s,t) restricts the action model a to the events that are consistent with observing t
as the result of executing the action in question in the state s. This is then lifted to sets of pairs (sets
of observations) in the obvious way in the definition of a |S.
3 Learning unconditional deterministic actions
In this section, we will consider learning of unconditional deterministic actions. We will, as
everywhere else in this article, restrict attention to universally applicable propositional actions. The
set of atomic propositions P is assumed to be fixed. From Proposition 3, item 4, we have that any
unconditional, deterministic and universally applicable action can be represented by a precondition-
free, basic and atomic action model (i.e. for any such action α, there is a precondition-free, basic and
atomic action model a with act(a)=α). This implies that if we want to construct a learner that can
learn unconditional, deterministic and universally applicable actions, it suffices to consider learning
functions that learn action models which are precondition-free, basic and atomic.
In basic action models, each post(e)(p) belongs to the set {⊤,⊥,p}. We can hence consider post(e)
to be a partial mapping from atomic propositions to {⊤,⊥}, that is of the form P ↪→ {⊤,⊥}. The
interpretation is then that when post(e)(p) is undefined we take this to mean post(e)(p)=p. The events
of basic action models can hence be considered to be of the form ⟨pre; f ⟩, where f :P ↪→ {⊤,⊥}. If
an action model is furthermore precondition-free, the events will have the form ⟨⊤; f ⟩. Any action
model which is precondition-free, basic and atomic can hence be represented by a single event of the
form ⟨⊤; f ⟩. This implies that when learning unconditional, deterministic and universally applicable
actions, we only have to look for the right event of the form ⟨⊤; f ⟩ to represent that action. This leads
to define our hypothesis space for learning such actions in the following way.
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∅
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p ⊥→# , q ⊥→#
p ⊤→# , q ⊤→#
p ⊤→#
Figure 1. On the left h0 with P={p,q}, together with sets corresponding to possible observations.
We have labelled each event e by post(e). On the right the state of learning with L0 after observing
E0 = ({q},{p,q}).
Definition 17
The hypothesis space for unconditional actions is the action model h0 given by
h0 ={⟨⊤; f ⟩ | f :P ↪→ {⊤,⊥}}.
The hypothesis space h0 will serve as the starting point of the learning process. The learner
will proceed with learning by gradually eliminating the elements inconsistent with the incoming
information (this process is known as update learning).
Definition 18
The update learning function for unconditional actions is the learning function L0 defined by
L0(E[n])=h0 | set(E[n]).
In Figure 1, we show a generic example of such update learning for P={p,q}. If the stream of
observations is consistent with one of the events in the space, as this is what we assume within this
framework, this event will never be eliminated from the space.
We will define a learning function which makes use of L0, but outputs an answer when there is
only one event left.
Theorem 4
The set of universally applicable, unconditional and deterministic actions is finitely identifiable by
the update learning function Lupdate0 , defined in the following way:
Lupdate0 (E[n])=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
L0(E[n]) if |L0(E[n])|=1
and for all k<n, Lupdate0 (E[k])= ↑;
↑ otherwise.
Proof. Note that Lupdate0 is defined in terms of L0, which by Definition 18 is given by L0(E[n])=h0 |
set(E[n]), where h0 is the hypothesis space. Let us take an unconditional deterministic action α and
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take E to be a stream for α. By Proposition 3, item 4, there must exist a precondition-free, basic and
atomic action model representing α. Hence, for some e∈h0, we must have act({e})=α. We show that
Lupdate0 finitely identifies α on E . Since E is a stream for α, e∈L0(E[n]) for any n (i.e. e will never be
eliminated). It remains to be shown that for some n∈N, |L0(E[n])|=1. Let us consider the smallest k
such that α⊆set(E[k]). Then there is only one element, e, in L0(E[k]). It is so because for all e′ ∈h0
with e′ ̸=e there is an observation (s,t)∈2P×2P such that (s,t)∈act({e}) but (s,t) /∈act({e′}) (in this
case we will say that (s,t) separates e from e′). Upon receiving this information the learner will
remove e′ from h0. In Figure 1, this general fact is clearly visible. For any pair of points (events), an
ellipse (observation) can be found that separates them (one event is consistent with it and the other
is not). To see how those observations can be constructively obtained take any e∈h0. Then for each
e′ ∈h0 with e′ ̸=e, it can easily be checked that at least one of the following observations separates
e from e′: (P,P⊗e) or (∅,∅⊗e). !
3.1 Time and space complexity
Note that Lupdate0 is defined in terms of the update learning function L0, which in turn is defined in
terms of the hypothesis space h0. The hypothesis space h0 is clearly exponential in |P| (it contains
one event per possible postcondition over P), so a straightforward implementation of Lupdate0 will
have a space requirement which is exponential in |P|. This kind of learning is clearly very memory-
inefficient. Below we will look into how this can be improved. We will first introduce the relevant
notions of computational complexity of learning in our setting, and then investigate the computational
complexity of learning unconditional deterministic actions. First, we consider time complexity and
then space complexity. In terms of time complexity, there are two relevant questions. First, how many
observations are needed before an action can be identified? Secondly, how many computation steps
does the implemented learning function need as a function of the number of observations?
In terms of space complexity, there are also two relevant questions. First, what is the size of the
action model provided as output of the learning algorithm? Secondly, how much memory does the
learning algorithm use? We will most often measure complexities in terms of the number of atomic
propositions underlying the set of actions to be learned.
3.1.1 Time complexity
Assume given a learning function L that finitely identifies a set of actions X over a set of atomic
propositions P. First note that a stream E for an action α∈X can have any number of repetitions, and
hence in general we can not give an upper bound on the length of the initial segment of E required
for L to identify α. We can, however, look at the number of distinct observations required to learn α,
that is, we either ignore repetitions in the stream or we only consider finite streams where all pairs
are distinct.
In any case, even for the simplest type of actions, unconditional deterministic actions, any learning
function will in the worst case require 1+2|P|−1 distinct observations before being able to identify
the action. To see this, consider the unconditional deterministic action α that makes all propositions
in P unconditionally true. It can be represented by an action model a={⟨⊤; {p 4→⊤ |p∈P}⟩}. Pick
a proposition p′ in P. Then there are 2|P|−1 propositional states over P where p′ is true. Assume the
stream X first provides an observation of (s,P) for each such propositional state s. Then after these
2|P|−1 observations, the action can still not be uniquely identified, because the stream is both sound for
α and for the action β which is as α except it does not affect the truth value of p′ (i.e. it is represented
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by an action model {⟨⊤; {p 4→⊤ |p∈P−{p′}}⟩}). Hence α can at earliest be identified when the
(1+2|P|−1)th distinct observation is made (and actually will be identified by that observation as is
easily seen).
Since the argument above was independent of the choice of L, it shows that all learning functions
for unconditional deterministic actions will have the same worst-case behaviour in terms of the
required number of distinct observations. The worst-case required number of distinct observations
is hence not a relevant complexity measure in this case. We can, however, look at proactive learning
of an action α: Learning where the learner gets to choose in which state s the action α is applied, and
the environment then replies with a t for which (s,t)∈α. In the case of unconditional deterministic
actions this makes a significant difference. The time complexity measured in number of distinct
observations goes down from O(2|P|) to O(1). Here is the argument. First the learner asks about
the effect of applying the action in the state ∅. This gives the learner an observation of the form
(∅,P1). Then the learner asks about the effect of applying the action in the state P. This gives an
observation (P,P2). Since the action is assumed to be unconditional, the learner now knows that it
unconditionally sets all the propositions in P1 true, and all the propositions in P−P2 false. Hence
it must be represented by the atomic action model {⟨⊤; {p 4→⊤ |p∈P1}∪{p 4→⊥ |p∈P−P2}⟩}. The
learner has now learned the action in only two observations.
However, when moving to learning of conditional actions, even proactive learning is not helpful.
This can be seen by realizing that in the case of a universally applicable, conditional and deterministic
action α, even the best-case number of distinct observations required to identify α is )(2|P|). To see
this, let E be any stream for α. We will show that no learner can identify α from the initial segment
E[2|P|−1]. Since E[2|P|−1] consists of at most 2|P|−1 distinct observations, there must exist a
propositional state s such that there is no t with (s,t)∈set(E[2|P|−1]). Let t be the propositional state
such that (s,t)∈α (α is deterministic and universally applicable). Let t′ ̸= t. Now letβ= (α−{(s,t)})∪
{(s,t′)}. The action β is clearly also conditional, deterministic and universally applicable. The initial
segment E[2|P|−1] is by construction also sound for β, so α can not be uniquely identified from
E[2|P|−1]. This shows that any learning function identifying the set X of universally applicable,
conditional and deterministic actions will always require *(2|P|) observations.
The discussion above shows that for finite identifiability, the time complexity measured in the
number of required distinct observations is in most cases not a useful measure to compare efficiency
of learning functions. It could still be relevant to look at the number of computation steps needed
by a learning function L to compute L(E[n]) as a function of n. This will, however, depend crucially
on details of how the learning function is implemented, including details about the choice of data
structures.
3.1.2 Space complexity
As mentioned earlier, we also have two relevant space measures: the total space required by an
algorithm implementing the learning function and the size of the action model provided as output. We
provide the space complexity measures for the learning function Lupdate0 in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
Lupdate0 can be implemented using O(|P|·3|P|) space. If Lupdate0 (E[n])=a for some action model a
then a has size O(|P|).
Proof. Lupdate0 is initialized with the hypothesis space h0 of Definition 17. The action model h0
contains O(3|P|) events: one for each partial mapping of P into {⊤,⊥} (so each p∈P is mapped into
one of three values:⊤,⊥ or ‘undefined’). Each event is of size O(|P|) (the length of the postcondition
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mapping), so the total size of h0 is O(|P|·3|P|). This is the total space requirement of the learning
algorithm, since it now proceeds by only eliminating events from h0. The size of the resulting action
model, the one eventually returned by Lupdate0 , is O(|P|), since it contains a single event. !
3.2 Improved learning of unconditional deterministic actions
We can improve the space complexity of learning unconditional deterministic actions. Instead of
updating a hypothesis space, we can keep track of the observed positive and negative effects of
the transitions in the stream, and build the action model from those. We call this effect learning.
Let (s,t) be a pair of propositional states. We define the observed positive effects of (s,t) to be the
set P+(s,t) ={p∈P |s |=¬p and t |=p}. Symmetrically, we define the observed negative effects to be
P−(s,t) ={p∈P |s |=p and t |=¬p}. Given an action α, we then define the observed positive effects of α
as P+α =
⋃
(s,t)∈αP+(s,t). Symmetrically for the observed negative effects. For any pair of disjoint sets
P+,P−⊆P, we let post(P+,P−)={p 4→⊤ |p∈P+}∪{p 4→⊥ |p∈P−}. We now get the following
result.
Theorem 5
The set of universally applicable, unconditional and deterministic actions is finitely identifiable by
the learning function Leffects0 , defined in the following way:
Leffects0 (E[n])=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{⟨⊤;post(P+set(E[n]),P−set(E[n]))⟩}
if for all literals l there is (s,t)∈set(E[n]) s.t. s |= l or t |= l,
and for all k<n, Leffects0 (E[k])= ↑
↑ otherwise.
Leffects0 can be implemented using O(|P|) space. If Leffects0 (E[n])=a for some action model a then a
has size O(|P|).
Proof. Letα be a universally applicable, unconditional and deterministic action and let E be a stream
for α. We need to show that Leffects0 finitely identifies α on E . Since α is universally applicable and E is
for α, for every literal l, E must contain at least one pair (s,t), where s |= l. This shows that there must
exist an n such that Leffects0 (E[n])={⟨⊤;post(P+set(E[n]),P−set(E[n]))⟩} and such that for all literals l there
is (s,t)∈set(E[n]) with s |= l or t |= l. Let e denote the event of Leffects0 (E[n]). It now remains to be
shown that act({e})=α. Choose e′ ∈h0, such that act({e′})=α (such an event must necessarily exist,
cf. the proof of Theorem 4). It suffices to prove e′=e, i.e. post(e′)(p)=post(e)(p) for all p∈P. First
suppose post(e)(p)=⊤. Then, by definition, for some (s,t)∈set(E[n]) we have s |=¬p and t |=p. Since
set(E[n])⊆α and act({e′})=α, this immediately implies post(e′)(p)=⊤. A symmetric argument
holds for the case of post(e)(p)=⊥. Now conversely assume post(e′)(p)=⊤. By choice of n, set(E[n])
contains at least one pair (s,t) where either s |=¬p or t |=¬p. Since post(e′)(p)=⊤, act({e′})=α and
E is for α, there can be no pair (s,t)∈set(E[n]) with t |=¬p. Hence, set(E[n]) must contain a pair (s,t)
with s |=¬p and t |=p. This implies p∈P+set(E[n]) and hence post(e)(p)=⊤. A symmetric argument
holds for the case of post(e′)(p)=⊥. We have now shown that post(e′)(p)=post(e)(p) for all p∈P,
as required.
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We now turn to the space complexity. The learning function can be implemented by the following
algorithm. The algorithm keeps a set P+ of the observed positive effects, a set P− of the observed
negative effects and a set L of literals. All sets are initially empty. For each (s,t)∈set(E[n]), the
algorithm then adds the elements of P+(s,t) to P+, the elements of P
−
(s,t) to P
−
, and any literal l such
that s |= l or t |= l is added to L. The algorithm then has to check the ‘stopping condition’: whether
for all literals l there is (s,t)∈set(E[n]) such that s |= l or t |= l. This is simply a question of checking
whether L contains all literals.
If the stopping condition is satisfied after receiving the last observation (and not earlier), the
algorithm will return the action model {⟨⊤;post(P+,P−)⟩}. It is easy to check that if this action model
is returned after the nth observation, then P+=P+set(E[n]) and P−=P−set(E[n]). The space requirement
is clearly O(|P|) as P+, P− and I are all of size O(|P|). If Leffects0 (E[n]) returns an action model it will
clearly have size O(|P|), since it is a single event where the postcondition is of length O(|P|). !
One of the crucial points about making the output of our learning functions be action models is, as
earlier mentioned, that they tend to be much more succinct than the actions (state-transition functions)
they represent.Any unconditional deterministic action will have size)(2|P|), since it contains exactly
one pair (s,t) for each propositional state s. Proposition 3, item 4, shows that such actions can be
represented using only O(|P|) space (by atomic action models). The result above shows that it is even
possible to learn such actions using only O(|P|) space in total.
In fact, the O(|P|) asymptotic upper bound on the size of the produced model guaranteed by
the learning function above is worst-case optimal among any learning function independent of
the representation chosen (whether it is the state-transition functions themselves, action models
or a completely different formalism). To see this, note that all 3|P| events of h0 represent
distinct unconditional deterministic actions. So any learning function for learning unconditional,
deterministic actions will be able to produce at least 3|P| different outputs. The space required to be
able to represent 3|P| different values is log(3|P|)=|P|log3=)(|P|).
4 Learning conditional deterministic actions
Above we were concerned with learning unconditional deterministic actions. These are particularly
simple as they can be represented by basic and atomic action models. We will now create a learning
method for arbitrary universally applicable and deterministic actions, i.e. actions that might be
conditional, but are still deterministic. No such conditional action can be represented by an atomic
and basic action model, which can be seen as follows. Suppose α is a universally applicable and
deterministic action, and a is an atomic and basic action model with act(a)=α. Since α is universally
applicable and act(a)=α, also a is universally applicable, by Proposition 3, item 1. Since a is then
universally applicable, atomic and basic, it must necessarily be precondition-free. By Proposition 3,
item 4, it follows that act(a) must be unconditional. Hence if a represents α, either α is unconditional
or a is not both basic and atomic. This implies that we need a more complex learning method to learn
conditional actions.
We first study learning by update, following the same structure as for learning unconditional
actions: we define a hypothesis space containing all the relevant events and then define the learning
function via update on that hypothesis space.
As in the previous section, we assume P to be fixed. For each s∈2P we define φs =∧p∈sp∧∧
p∈P−s¬p.
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Definition 19
The hypothesis space for deterministic actions is the action model h1 given by
h1 = {⟨φs ; f ⟩ |s∈2P and f :P ↪→ {⊤,⊥}
where f (p) ̸=⊤ if φ |=p and f (p) ̸=⊥ if φ |=¬p}.
The last condition of the definition saying that ‘f (p) ̸=⊤ if φ |=p and f (p) ̸=⊥ if φ |=¬p’ simply
ensures that h1 satisfies condition 3 of being basic.
Definition 20
The update learning function for deterministic actions is the learning function L1 defined by
L1(E[n])=h1 | set(E[n]).
Theorem 6
The set of universally applicable and deterministic actions is finitely identifiable by the update learning
function Lupdate1 , defined in the following way
Lupdate1 (E[n])=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
L1(E[n]) if L1(E[n]) is globally deterministic
and for all k<n, Lupdate1 (E[k])= ↑;
↑ otherwise.
Lupdate1 can be implemented using O(|P|·4|P|) space. If Lupdate1 (E[n])=a for some action model a
then a has size O(|P|·2|P|).
Proof. Let us take such an action α as prescribed in the theorem and let E be a stream for α. We need
to prove that for some n, act(Lupdate1 (E[n]))=α. Take n to be the smallest such that α⊆set(E[n]).
We will first prove α=act(L1(E[n])).
For α⊆act(L1(E[n])). Assume (s,t)∈α. The hypothesis space h1 contains the event ⟨φs ; f ⟩ with
f (p)=⊤ for all p∈ t−s and f (p)=⊥ for all p∈s−t. Clearly, s⊗⟨φs ; f ⟩= t. Hence (s,t)∈act(h1).
We need to show that (s,t)∈act(L1(E[n])), i.e. that the event ⟨φs ; f ⟩ is not eliminated by the stream
of observations E[n]. Note that the precondition of ⟨φs ; f ⟩ is φs, so only observations of the form
(s,t′) can eliminate the event. Furthermore, since s⊗⟨φs ; f ⟩= t, only observations of the form (s,t′)
with t′ ̸= t can eliminate the event. However, since α is deterministic and E is for a, if (s,t′)∈E then
t′= t.
For act(L1(E[n]))⊆α. Assume (s,t) /∈α. We then need to prove (s,t) /∈act(L1(E[n])). Let ⟨φs ; f ⟩
be an arbitrary event of h1 with t=s⊗⟨φs ; f ⟩. It suffices to prove that this event is eliminated in
L1(E[n]). Since α is universally applicable there must be a t′ ̸= t such that (s,t′)∈α. Since α⊆
set(E[n]), (s,t′)∈set(E[n]). We now have s |=φs but s⊗⟨φs ; f ⟩ ̸= t′, so ⟨φs ; f ⟩ /∈h1 | (s,t′), and hence
⟨φs ; f ⟩ /∈h1 |set(E[n]). This shows that the required event is eliminated in L1(E[n]).
We have now proven α=act(L1(E[n])). Since α is deterministic and α=act(L1(E[n])), L1(E[n])
can not contain two distinct events of h1 with identical preconditions. This implies that L1(E[n]) is
globally deterministic. The only thing left to prove is hence that the n chosen above is the smallest
number for which L1(E[n]) is globally deterministic. Consider any m<n.
Then α−set(E[m]) ̸=∅, by choice of n. Choose (s,t)∈α−set(E[m]). Since E is sound for a and
a is deterministic, there can be no pair of the form (s,t′) in E[m]. Hence, L1(E[n]) will contain all
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events from h1 of the form ⟨φs ; f ⟩ and hence will not be globally deterministic (h1 contains at least
two such events for all non-empty P).
We now turn to the space complexity results. Lupdate1 is initialized with the hypothesis space
h1 of Definition 19. As for L
update
0 , the total space requirement of the learning algorithm is the
space requirement of the initial hypothesis space. Each proposition p∈P can either occur positively
or negatively in the precondition φs of an event ⟨φs ; f ⟩ of h1. If it occurs positively, then either
f (p)=⊥ or f (p) is undefined, by definition of h1. Symmetrically, if p occurs negatively in φs, then
either f (p)=⊤ or f (p) is undefined. In other words, each proposition p can occur in 4 different
configurations in the events of h1. This implies that the number of events in h1 is O(4|P|). Since
each event is of length O(|P|), h1 has size O(|P|·4|P|), which is the total space consumption of the
algorithm. If Lupdate1 (E[n])=a for some action model a, then a is a globally deterministic submodel
of h1, by definition of L
update
1 . Such a model can only have 1 event per possible precondition φs with
s∈2P, hence in total O(2|P|) events. Each event still has length O(|P|), so the total size of the action
model is O(|P|·2|P|). !
The learning method Lupdate1 proposed in Theorem 6 is yet another example of how learning
deterministic action models can be seen as the process of gradually increasing the ‘amount of
determinism’ in an action model. We have already made a note of it in Section 2.1. This time,
however, this feature of learning becomes more pronounced, as it is explicitly present in the halting
condition of the learning function Lupdate1 . Each time upon performing an update the learner checks
whether the resulting restriction of the original model is globally deterministic. Once this check
yields a positive result learning is concluded. Let us now present some concrete examples of the
performance of Lupdate1 .
Example 5
Consider a simple scenario with a pushbutton and a light bulb. Assume there is only one proposition
p: ‘the light is on’, and only one action: pushing the button. We assume an agent wants to learn
the functioning of the pushbutton. The learner starts with the action model h1, which in the case of
P={p} is:
h1 ={⟨p;∅⟩,⟨¬p;∅⟩,⟨p;p 4→⊥⟩,⟨¬p;p 4→⊤⟩}
Assume the first two observations the learner receives (the first elements of a stream E) are (∅,{p})
and ({p},∅). This corresponds to a pushbutton that turns the light on if it is currently off, and vice
versa. The learner revises her model in the following way:
Now the agent has reached a globally deterministic action model, and can hence report it to be the
correct model of the action. Note that the two observations correspond to first pushing the button
when the light is off (E0), and afterwards pushing the button again after the light has come on (E1).
These two observations are sufficient to learn the type of the pushbutton.
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Consider now another stream E ′, for a different action where the first two elements are (∅,{p}) and
({p},{p}). This time the pushbutton unconditionally turns on the light. The learner reaches a globally
deterministic action model in two steps, this time an atomic one (which is possible since the action
is unconditional).
4.1 Improved learning of conditional deterministic actions
As for unconditional actions, we can improve the space complexity by keeping track of observed
positive and negative effects rather than doing simple update learning. However, since actions are
potentially conditional, we need to keep track of the possibility of distinct effects in distinct states.
In the result below, recall that we have defined post(P+,P−)={p 4→⊤ |p∈P+}∪{p 4→⊥ |p∈P−}.
Theorem 7
The set of universally applicable and deterministic actions is finitely identifiable by the learning
function Leffects1 , defined in the following way:
Leffects1 (E[n])=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{⟨φs ;post(P+(s,t),P−(s,t))⟩ | (s,t)∈set(E[n])}
if for all states s∈2P there is (s,t)∈set(E[n]),
and for all k<n, Leffects1 (E[k])= ↑
↑ otherwise.
Leffects1 can be implemented using O(|P|·2|P|) space. If Leffects1 (E[n])=α for some action model a
then a has size O(|P|·2|P|).
Proof. Let α be as prescribed and let E be a stream for α. Since α is deterministic and universally
applicable, set(E) will contain exactly one pair of the form (s,t) for each s∈2P. Choose the smallest n
so that also set(E[n]) has this property. Then we must have α=set(E[n]) due to determinism of α. By
definition of the learning function we then also have Leffects1 (E[n])={⟨φs ;post(P+(s,t),P−(s,t))⟩ | (s,t)∈
α}. We need to proveα=act(Leffects1 (E[n])). To proveα⊆act(Leffects1 (E[n])) it suffices to show that for
all (s,t)∈α, t=s⊗⟨φs ;post(P+(s,t),P−(s,t))⟩. This is trivial given the definitions of P+(s,t) and P−(s,t). For
act(Leffects1 (E[n]))⊆α, we have to prove that if t′=s′⊗⟨φs ;post(P+(s,t),P−(s,t))⟩ for some pair (s′,t′) and
some choice of (s,t)∈α then (s′,t′)∈α. From t′=s′⊗⟨φs ;post(P+(s,t),P−(s,t))⟩we immediately get s′=
s. We now have t= (s−P−(s,t))∪P+(s,t) =s⊗⟨φs ;post(P+(s,t),P−(s,t))⟩=s′⊗⟨φs ;post(P+(s,t),P−(s,t))⟩= t′.
This shows (s′,t′)= (s,t)∈α.
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We now turn to the complexity results. The learning function can be implemented by the following
algorithm. For each s∈2P, we store a boolean value bs, and two sets P+s ,P−s ⊆P. Initially bs =0 and
P+s =P−s =∅ for all s. For each observation (s,t), the algorithm then does the following: if bs =0 then
we assign bs :=1, P+s :=P+(s,t), P−s :=P−(s,t). After each observation, the algorithm checks whether
bs =1 for all s∈2P. If so, the action model {⟨φs ;post(P+s ,P−s )⟩ |s∈2P} is returned. It is easy to
check that this indeed implements Leffects1 . Since the algorithm for each s∈2P stores a boolean and
two subsets of P, the space requirement is O(|P|·2|P|). The action model returned contains for each
s∈2P an event of length O(|P|), so it also has size O(|P|·2|P|). !
As for learning unconditional actions, we can prove that the size of the produced model of
the learning function above is worst-case optimal, again independent of the action representation
chosen. First, we note that any deterministic, universally applicable action α determines a unique
mapping fα :2P→2P satisfying (s,t)∈α iff fα(s)= t. Conversely, any such mapping determines a
unique deterministic, universally applicable action. Hence the number of deterministic, universally
applicable actions is equal to the number of such mappings, which is (2|P|)(2|P|). Thus, any learning
function for learning such actions will be able to produce (2|P|)(2|P|) different outputs. The space
requirement to be able to represent (2|P|)(2|P|) different values is log((2|P|)(2|P|))=2|P| ·log(2|P|)=
2|P| · |P|log2=2|P| · |P|, which is the space requirement guaranteed by the learning function above.
4.2 Parametrized learning of conditional deterministic actions
The above results study worst-case space complexities in terms of the number of atomic propositions.
In some environments, the set of atomic propositions might be quite high, for instance, the
environment of a domestic robot. Still, most individual actionsα in such environments only depend on
relatively few propositions (have a small pre(α)). For instance, the action α of pushing a particular
light switch might have pre(α)={p}, where p represents the current state of the switch/light. Of
course, there could be more preconditions in pre(α) encoding whether the bulb is broken, whether
the fuse is blown, etc., but the size of pre(α) would still be very low compared to potentially 100s
or 1000s or atomic propositions in the domain. We will now present an improved learning function
that takes this into account. The learning function is parametrized by an upper bound j on the size of
pre(α) (i.e. the number of preconditions is at most j). In many domains, it is reasonable to assume a
fixed upper bound on the number of preconditions for all actions in the domain (the outcome of any
action can only depend on the truth value of a given number of propositions).
Given an action α and a propositional formula φ, we use α"φ to denote the restriction of α to the
states satisfying φ, i.e. α"φ={(s,t)∈α |s |=φ}. For all j≤ |P|, we define+j ={∧p∈sp∧∧p∈P′−s¬p |
P′ ⊆P, |P′|= j, and s∈2P′}. The elements of +j are conjunctions of exactly j literals.
Two state-transition pairs (s,t) and (s′,t′) are called compatible if the following conditions hold for
all p∈P: if p∈P+(s,t), then t′ |=p; if p∈P−(s,t), then t′ |=¬p; if p∈P+(s′,t′), then t |=p; and if p∈P−(s′,t′),
then t |=¬p. It is clear from this definition that if two pairs (s,t) and (s′,t′) are incompatible, there
can be no single event e with t=s⊗e and t′=s′⊗e. Compatibility between (s,t) and (s′,t′) can
equivalently be defined as the condition ((t−s)−t′)∪((s−t)∩t′)∪((t′−s′)−t)∪((s′−t′)∩t)=∅.
Theorem 8
Let Xj denote the set of universally applicable and deterministic actions α satisfying
|pre(α)|≤j. The set Xj is finitely identifiable by the learning function Leffects2 , defined in the
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following way:
Leffects2 (E[n])=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{⟨φ;post(P+set(E[n])!φ,P−set(E[n])!φ)⟩ |φ∈+j and
all (s,t),(s′,t′)∈set(E[n])"φ are compatible}
if for all ψ ∈+min{|P|,2j+1} there is (s,t)∈set(E[n]), s.t. s |=ψ,
and for all m<n, Leffects2 (E[m])= ↑;
↑ otherwise.
Leffects2 can be implemented using O(
( |P|
min{|P|,2j+1}
)·2min{|P|,2j+1}+(|P|j )·2j ·|P|) space. If
Leffects2 (E[n])=α for an action model a then a has size O(
(|P|
j
)·2j ·|P|).
Proof. Let α be as prescribed in the theorem and let E be a stream for α. Since α is universally
applicable there exists an n such that:
Leffects2 (E[n])={⟨φ;post(P+set(E[n])!φ,P−set(E[n])!φ)⟩ |φ∈+j and
all (s,t),(s′,t′)∈set(E[n])"φ are compatible},
and for all φ∈+2j+1 there is (s,t)∈set(E[n]), s.t. s |=φ.
We need to prove act(Leffects2 (E[n]))=α.
Forα⊆act(Leffects2 (E[n])). Since |pre(α)|≤ j, there must be a set P′ ⊆P satisfying |P′|= j and pre(α)⊆
P′. Then α is uniform in P−P′. Assume (s,t)∈α. We need to prove (s,t)∈act(Leffects2 (E[n])). By
uniformity of α in P−P′, there exists P+ and P−, such that for all s′ with s′⊖s⊆P−P′, (s,(s−
P−)∪P+)∈α.
Let φ=∧p∈s∩P′ p∧∧p∈P′−s¬p. Clearly, s |=φ. Note that for any s′ with s′ |=φ, we have s′⊖s⊆
P−P′ and hence (s′,(s′−P−)∪P+)∈α. We then get that any two pairs (s′,t′),(s′′,t′′)∈α"φ must be
compatible, and hence that any two pairs (s′,t′),(s′′,t′′)∈set(E[n])"φ are also compatible.
Since φ∈+j, we then get that Leffects2 (E[n])) contains the event eφ=
⟨φ;post(P+set(E[n])!φ,P−set(E[n])!φ)⟩. Since s |=φ and pre(eφ)=φ, we get s |=pre(eφ), and hence
(s,s⊗eφ)∈Leffects2 (E[n]). To prove (s,t)∈Leffects2 (E[n]) it, therefore, suffices to show that
P+set(E[n])!φ−s=P+−s and P−set(E[n])!φ−s=P−−s. We only prove P+set(E[n])!φ−s=P+−s, the
other case being analogous. Assume first p∈P+−s. Since s |=φ and p /∈s, either ¬p is a conjunct
of φ or p does not occur in φ. Since φ∈+j, in both cases there exists a φ′ ∈+min{|P|,2j+1} such that
φ′ |=φ∧¬p. By choice of n there then exists (s′,t′)∈set(E[n]) with s′ |=φ∧¬p. Since set(E[n])⊆α,
we have (s′,t′)∈α, and since s′ |=φ we then get t′= (s′−P−)∪P+. Since p∈P+ this implies t′ |=p.
We now have s′ |=φ, s′ |=¬p, t′ |=p and (s′,t′)∈set(E[n]). This implies p∈P+set(E[n])!φ , as required.
Now suppose opposite, that p∈P+set(E[n])!φ−s. Then by definition there must exist (s′,t′)∈
set(E[n])"φ such that s′ |=¬p and t′ |=p. Since set(E[n])⊆α, we get (s′,t′)∈α, and since s′ |=φ,
we get t′= (s′−P−)∪P+. Since s′ |=¬p and t′ |=p, necessarily p∈P+.
For act(Leffects2 (E[n]))⊆α. Suppose, to achieve a contradiction, that it does not hold. Then there
must be a pair (s,t)∈act(Leffects2 (E[n]))−α. Since α is universally applicable, for some t′ we have
(s,t′)∈α. Since (s,t) ̸∈α, t′ ̸= t. Hence there exists a p∈P with p∈ t′⊖t. We can assume t |=p
and t′ |=¬p, the other case being symmetric. We either have s |=p or s |=¬p. We can assume
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s |=¬p, again since the other case is symmetric. Then p∈P+(s,t). Since (s,t),(s,t′)∈act(Leffects2 (E[n]))
there must exist formulas φ,ψ ∈+j such that eφ= ⟨φ;post(P+set(E[n])!φ,P−set(E[n])!φ)⟩ and eψ =
⟨ψ ;post(P+set(E[n])!ψ ,P−set(E[n])!ψ )⟩ are events of Leffects2 (E[n]) and t=s⊗eφ and t′=s⊗eψ .
Since φ,ψ ∈+j, there exists γ ∈+min{|P|,2j+1} with γ |=φ∧ψ∧¬p.
Hence by choice of n there exists (s′′,t′′)∈set(E[n]) with s′′ |=γ . Now we have (s,t),(s′′,t′′)∈
set(E[n])"φ and (s,t′),(s′′,t′′)∈set(E[n])"ψ . If t′′ |=p then p∈P+(s′′,t′′) and since t′ |=¬p, the two
observations (s,t′),(s′′,t′′) of set(E[n])"ψ are incompatible, contradicting that eψ is an event of
Leffects2 (E[n]). If t′′ |=¬p then since p∈P+(s,t) the two observations (s,t),(s′′,t′′) of set(E[n])"φ are
incompatible, contradicting that eφ is an event of L
effects
2 (E[n]).
We now turn to the complexity claims. The learning function can be implemented by the following
algorithm. For each φ∈+min{|P|,2j+1} the algorithm stores a boolean bseenφ which is initially 0. If
an observation (s,t) with s |=φ is received, we assign bseenφ :=1. The learning function additionally
for each φ∈+j keeps track of the following information. First, there is a boolean bincludeφ which
is initially 1, and which encodes whether the resulting action model should include the event with
precondition φ. Secondly, for each literal l there is a boolean b+φ,l recording whether an observation
(s,t) with s |=φ, s |=¬l and t |= l has been made. Thirdly, there is a boolean b=φ,l recording whether
an observation (s,t) with s |=φ, s |= l and t |= l has been made. With these booleans we can keep track
of whether all observations (s,t),(s′,t′) with s |=φ and s′ |=φ are compatible. If an observation (s,t)
with s |=φ is made that is incompatible with the earlier observations, we set bincludeφ =0.
After each observation, it is checked whether all bseenφ =1. If so, we return the action model that
for each φ∈+j with bincludeφ =1 contains the event ⟨φ;post(P+φ ,P−φ )⟩ having P+φ ={p∈P |b+φ,p =1}
and P−φ ={p∈P |b+φ,¬p =1}. To store the booleans bseenφ we need as many bits as the size of
+min{|P|,2j+1}. The set +min{|P|,2j+1} contains conjunctions of min{|P|,2j+1} literals from P.
There are
( |P|
min{|P|,2j+1}
)
ways to choose min{|P|,2j+1} distinct propositions from P, and each
proposition can then either occur positively or negatively. This gives that the size of+min{|P|,2j+1} is( |P|
min{|P|,2j+1}
)·2min{|P|,2j+1}. Additionally, we are for each φ∈+j storing a boolean bincludeφ , and for
each combination of φ∈+j and literal l we are storing 2 additional booleans b+φ,l and b=φ,l. The size
of +j is
(|P|
j
)·2j. The number of literals is O(|P|). Hence we need additionally O((|P|j )·2j ·|P|) bits.
This gives the result on the space consumption of the algorithm. The produced action model has an
event of length O(|P|) for at most each φ∈+j, so the size of this model is O(
(|P|
j
)·2j ·|P|). !
We note the following interesting special cases of the space complexity of the produced action models.
Unconditional actions have j=0. For j=0 we get O((|P|j )·2j ·|P|)=O(|P|), which is exactly the result
on the size of the produced action model for unconditional actions we achieved in Theorem 5. For
conditional actions in general (with no restrictions on the preconditions) we have j=|P|. Then we
get O((|P|j )·2j ·|P|)=O(2|P| · |P|), which is exactly the result achieved in Theorem 7. For the special
case of unary preconditions, j=1, we get O((|P|j )·2j ·|P|)=O(|P|2).
5 Conclusions
In this article, we studied the problem of learnability of action models in dynamic epistemic logic. We
provided an extensional treatment of actions viewed as sets of transitions between propositional states.
This approach is especially useful for our learnability framework: we can relate the observations of
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action executions to the concise representations of actions in dynamic epistemic logic. We studied
fully observable propositional action models with respect to conclusive (finite identifiability) and
inconclusive (identifiability in the limit) learnability. Apart from the general learnability results,
we introduced learning functions which proceed via gradual restriction of action models. Here,
by implementing the update method (commonly used in dynamic epistemic logic, in a different
context), we demonstrated how the learning of action models can be seen as transitioning from
non-deterministic to deterministic actions.
5.1 Related work
A similar qualitative approach to learning actions has been addressed by [25] within the STRIPS
planning formalism. The STRIPS setting is more general than ours in that it uses atoms of first-
order predicate logic for pre- and postconditions. It is, however, less general in neglecting various
aspects of actions which we have successfully treated in this article, e.g. negative preconditions
negative postconditions and conditional actions (actions with conditional effects). We believe that
our framework can be applied to generalize the results of [25] to richer planning frameworks allowing
such action types. Even though some of the previous work uses the basic mechanisms of update
learning (SLAFS learning [23] and learning within the STRIPS formalism [25]) it rarely goes beyond
basic update, as we do here with the effect learning. There has been quite substantial amount of work
in relating dynamic epistemic logic and learning theory (see [15, 16] for overviews), where iterated
update and upgrade revision policies are treated as long-term learning methods, where learning is
seen as convergence to certain types of knowledge (see [3, 5]). A study of abstract properties of finite
identifiability in a setting similar to ours, including various efficiency considerations, can be found
in [17].
5.2 Future work
In this article we laid the groundwork for our subsequent studies of learnability of action models. We
only considered fully observable actions models, and hence did not use the full expressive power of
the DEL-formalism, which offers a principled way of describing actions in a logical setting, and opens
ways to various extensions. Those include: non-deterministic, partially observable and multi-agent
action models.
Non-deterministic action models are more difficult to learn via update methods. It is so because an
observed outcome of an execution of an action in a given propositional state does not allow excluding
the possibility that at a different point in time the execution of the action in the same propositional
state will yield a different result. As described earlier, partially observable actions are not learnable
in the strict sense considered above, but we can still investigate agents learning ‘as much as possible’
given their limitations in observability. The multi-agent case is particularly interesting due to the
possibility of agents with varied limitations on observability, and the possibility of communication
within the learning process. Furthermore, we here considered only what we call reactive learning: the
learner has no influence over which observations are received. Another direction is that of proactive
learning, where the learner gets to choose which actions to execute. This is probably the most relevant
type of learning for a general learning-and-planning agent. In this context, we also plan to focus on
consecutive streams: streams corresponding to executing sequences of actions rather than observing
arbitrary state transitions. Our ultimate aim is to relate learning and planning within the framework
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of DEL. Those two cognitive capabilities are now investigated mostly in separation—our goal is to
bridge them.
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